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On  20  October· 1998  the  Commission  submitted to  the  Council  a  proposal  for  a 
Directive relating to the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the  levying 
of charges for the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification (COM (98)480 
final
1
- SYN 98/0267. 
On  10 March 1999 the European Parliament gave an opinion on the proposal at first 
reading.  After the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty on  1st  May  1999,  the 
Parliament had to re-confirm its first  reading. The Parliament reconfirmed its earlier 
opinion at its plenary session on 15th September 1999. 
The Economic  and Social Committee gave  its opinion on  the  proposal on  26  May 
1999. The Committee of the Regions has not so far given its opinion. 
The Commission accepts the following European Parliament amendments; 
amendment 3 because the proposed recital argues for  a staged opening of 
the  market  which  is  in  line  with  Treaty  obligations  and  Commission 
proposal 95(337). 
amendment  4  because  the  proposed  recital  urges  progress  on  technical 
harmonisation which the Commission recognises is important. 
amendment 6 because the proposed recital emphasises the importance of fair 
inter  modal  competition  which  is  needed  to  ensure  efficient  optimal 
transport choices. 
amendment 7 because this results in a better definition. 
amendment 8 because this makes the definition more precise. 
amendment  9  because  this  would  oblige  Member  States  to  establish  a 
charging framework. 
amendment  11  because  it  takes account of the  fact  that  services  may  be 
provided by several managers or service providers. 
amendment  16 because it  streamlines the text while retaining the principle 
proposed. 
Amendment 19 is accepted in principle because it permits parties other than 
railway undertakings  to  be  Applicants subject  to  national  legislation.  The 
effect has been implemented in article 19  and a change of the definition in 
Article  2.  In  addition  references  throughout  the  text  to  "authorised 
applicant" have been changed to "applicant". 
amendment 28 because the exchange of views between government services 
which it requires will be beneficial. 
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2 The  Commission  accepts  the  principles  <:ontained  within  amendment  14  namely: 
simplification of the rules for passenger traffic, and the possibility to increase freight 
charges  where  it  has  been  demonstrated  that  this  does  not  damage  intermodal 
competitiveness. Articles 8 and 9 have consequently been reformulated in this spirit. 
The Commission could not accept the other amendments proposed by the Parliament 
for the following reasons: 
amendment  5.  The  Commission  recognises  that  greater competition  can 
improve  cross-border freight  services,  and  it  also  acknowledges  that  co-
operation  does  have  a  role  provided  it  respects  Community  competition 
rules.  However, neither of these issues is directly relevant to the proposal 
which only relates to the setting of charges and the allocation of capacity. In 
addition, the concept of permitting parties other than railway undertakings 
to  seek  capacity  may  be  important  to  improve  the  attractiveness  of rail 
services and it  does not alter the ability of licensed railway undertakings to 
provide any services. 
amendment  10  would permit  an  alternative  model allowing  delegation of 
charging rules and the receipt of charges to the Regulatory body, this would 
then require a separate appeal body. This is rejected because it confuses the 
need for a body able to  regulate the actions of the infrastructure manager 
and  would result  in  more  bureaucracy. · The Commission proposal  in  any 
case would enable charging to be performed by a body other than a railway 
undertaking. 
Amendment 12 is rejected because the original proposal contains an explicit 
possibility  for  charges  to  include  a  rate  of return  for  charges  to  cover 
investments. However, the drafting of Art 9 (see amendment 14) will permit 
higher charges for both freight and passenger traffic which could include a 
rate of return. It follows that this amendment is unnecessary, and in any case 
misplaced in Art 8(3). 
Amendment 13 is rejected because it would remove the majority of the text 
relating to external costs, postponing the possible internalisation of external 
cost until an  intermodal solution is found.  However, the Commission is  of 
the  opinion that  individual  Member States  should have  the  possibility· to 
introduce external cost charging provided that there is a safeguard to ensure 
that  rail  does not  get penalised  for  its  external costs in  advance  of other 
modes. 
Amendment  15  is  rejected  because  it  would  remove  much  of the  clarity 
concerning the limitations on discounts. Discounts are however a frequent, 
and easy method of discriminating between undertakings. While in  certain 
activities  company  specific  contracts  might  be  reasonable  commercial 
behaviour, that is not the case for rail infrastructure. 
Amendment  17  is  rejected because it  would prevent the  attainment of one 
objective of the proposal which  is  to enable infrastructure managers in  the 
first  place  to  optimise  capacity  allocation  and  to  attempt  to  satisfy  the 
requirements of all traffic.  This will enable more intensive use  to  be  made 
3 of rail  infrastructure,  thus  reducing  average  costs  and  making  all  rail 
services cheaper. On the other hand, where it is possible under the proposed 
rules for capacity allocation to determine priority criteria this should be  left 
to the Member States, following the subsidiarity principle. There is no need 
to  lay  down  at  Community  level  an  explicit  priority  for  public  services. 
Moreover,  the  part of the  amendment  which  deals  with  the  granting  of 
special rights, 14a (lb), is already covered by Article 27 of the proposal and 
is therefore redundant. The proposed 14a (2) is redundant as a consequence 
of the  rejection of 14a  (1a).  It  is  in  any  case  superfluous  because  such 
compensation is not prevented by the proposal, but is  possible through the 
purchase of the relevant capacity by the operator of the services. Moreover 
the question of compensation for public services is dealt with in Regulation 
1191169  as  amended,  and  does  not  therefore  fall  within  the  scope of the 
present proposal. 
Amendment 18 is rejected because it duplicates amendment 17 but in more 
general terms, and for the reasons mentioned above. With regard to ensuring 
the financing of new  infrastructure,  Article  9  (2)  coupled  with  Article 27 
already  make  adequate  provision  for  this  and  further  reference  is 
unnecessary. 
Amendment 20 is  rejected because it  would extend the maximum duration 
of Framework contracts to  7  years,  and  makes  longer  periods  less  of an 
exception. The Commission completely understands the need for assurance 
to make investments, which was the motivation for inclusion of this article. 
Nevertheless, it believes that 5 years is an appropriate normal length of time 
for  such  agreements.  It  is  quite  likely  that  commercial  requirements  will 
change over that  period,  but in  any case the  proposal  provides  for  longer 
periods where these are justified by investment. In  view of this there is  no 
reason to lengthen the normal period. The exception to the  normal period 
must  be  something  that  needs  to  be  justified  to  ensure  that  it  does  not 
become the standard length. 
Amendment 21  is rejected because it would delete the obligation to treat all 
services equally and to consult on the draft timetable. The obligation to treat 
all  services equally is  fundamental to the proposal, and to making optimal 
use  of  infrastructure.  The  Commission  proposal  does  not  foresee  the 
granting  of priority  for  specific  traffic  types,  in  the  absence  of absolute 
scarcity of capacity. The requirement to consult users on the draft timetable 
is good practice. It is  difficult to see why that might be undesirable, and in 
particular  .it  is  important  to  remember  the  monopolistic  status  of 
infrastructure managers. 
Amendment  22  is  rejected  because  it  would  remove  the  need  to  consult 
applicants during the co-ordination process, and to publish the principles in 
the  network  statement.  Both  of these  are  an  essential  part  of requiring 
openness and transparency in the allocation process. 
Amendment  23  is  rejected  because  the  proposed three  month  deadline  is 
only needed as a result of amendment 26 and that amendment is rejected. 
4 Amendment  24  is  partially  rejected  because  one  factor  hampering  the 
development of freight traffic is the difficulty of identifying train paths for 
freight traffic at  short notice. Currently for much traffic, by the time that a 
path  could  be  identified,  it  will  be  too  late  to  operate  the  service. 
Nevertheless, in  keeping with the  spirit of the amendment, the text of the 
article has been considerably simplified. 
Amendment 25  is  rejected because  it  would only retain  the  possibility to 
designate particular infrastructure but  would delete  the  possibility to give 
priority  to  .certain  traffic  types  on  specialised  infrastructure,  and  the 
Commission  believes  that  this  possibility  is  essential  for  certain 
infrastructures. J'his would be  the case  for  high  speed passenger lines  or 
freight  lines,  where  it  is  natural  for  priority  to  be  given  to the  types  of 
service for which the infrastructure was developed.  Nevertheless, it  is  also 
important  to  ensure  that  where other traffic  meets  the  characteristics  for 
operation  on the  line,  then  that too  should  be  able  to  operate if there  is 
capacity. 
Amendment 26 is rejected because the procedure for establishing a capacity 
analysis,  which  it  would delete,  will  encourage  more  optimal  use  of rail 
infrastructure  and  lower  costs.  It  is  intended  to  be  followed  when  all 
demands for capacity cannot be met in the scheduling process. Many factors 
can affect the availability of capacity and these components can be affected 
by and have cost implications for many different parties. The monopolistic 
nature  of the  infrastructure  manager,  means  that  it  is  vital  that  he  must 
consult other parties that will be affected. These different determinants, and 
the possible trade-offs between them,  mean that it  is  important to have an 
open discussion, within an appropriate timescale for the results to be of use 
during the timetabling process. 
Amendment  27  is  rejected  because  it  would  delete  the  requirement  to 
consult users when developing an enhancement plan, or to indicate any of 
the  factors  taken  into  account,  or a  timetable  of action.  However,  these 
points are essential elements of the  development of the enhancement plan 
that  need  to  be  spelt  out.  Infrastructure  managers  are  in  a  monopoly 
position,  and it  is  important that they are  required to take account of the 
views of infrastructure users. Since it  is  likely that users will end up having 
to  pay where the enhancement plan  identifies  investment.s  they should be 
able  to offer their views on the  desirability of the  proposal.  Nevertheless 
some clarification and simplification of the text has been carried out in the 
spirit of the Parliament's proposed changes. 
5 Amended proposal for a 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 
Relating to the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of 
charges for the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification 
THE EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  AND  THE COUNCIL  OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in  particular 
Article 71 thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission
2
, 
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee
3
, 
Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions
4 
Acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 251 of the Treaty
5
, 
Whereas: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
2 
4 
6 
7 
Greater integration of the Community railway sector is an essential element of 
the completion of the internal market and moves toward achieving sustainable 
mobility. 
Council Directive 911440/EEC6  of 29 July  1991  on  the development  of the 
Community's railways provides for certain access rights  in  international rail 
transport  for  railway  undertakings  and  international  groupings  of railway 
undertakings;  these  rights  mean  that  railway  infrastructure  can  be  used  by 
multiple users. 
Council  Directive  95/19/EC  of 19  June  1995  on  the  allocation  of railway 
infrastructure capacity and the charging of infrastructure fees
7 set out a broad 
framework for the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity. 
Those Directives have permitted a considerable variation in  the  structure and 
level of railway infrastructure charges and the form and duration of capacity 
allocation processes. 
OJ C 321,20.10.1998 
OJC 
OJC 
OJC 
OJ L 237, 24.8.1991, p. 25. 
OJ L 143. 27.6.1995, p. 75. 
6 (5)  Appropriate capacity-allocation  schemes  for  rail  infrastructure coupled with 
competitive  operators  will  result  in  a  better  balance  of transport  between 
modes. 
(6)  Encouraging optimal use of the railway infrastructure will lead to a reduction 
in the cost to s_ociety of transport. 
(7)  An efficient freight  sector, especially across  borders, requires  action for the 
opening up of the market. 
(7a)  The  gradual  opening-up  of rail  transport  markets  must. be  accompanied  by 
technical harmonisation measures, which should be introduced as  quickly and 
efficiently as possible. 
(8)  It may be desirable for purchasers of railway services to be able to enter the 
capacity-allocation process direct. 
(Sa)  The  revitalisation  of European  railways  by  means  of  greater  competition 
between European railway  undertakings  requires  fair  intermodal competitive 
conditions between rail and road, particularly by taking appropriate account of 
the different external effects. 
(9)  The charging and capacity-allocation schemes should permit equal and non-
discriminatory access for all undertakings and attempt as far as is possible to 
meet the needs of all users and traffic types in a fair and non-discriminatory 
manner. 
(10)  Charging  and  capacity-allocation  schemes  should  encourage  railway 
infrastructure managers to optimise  use of their infrastructure for society as 
a whole. 
(11)  Railway  undertakings  should  receive  clear  and  consistent  signals  from 
capacity-allocation schemes which lead them to make rational decisions. 
(12)  It is desirable to grant some degree of flexibility to infrastructure managers to 
enable a more efficient use to be made of the infrastructure network. 
(13)  Gapacity allocation and charging schemes may need to take account of the fact 
that different  components of the  rail  infrastructure network may  have  been 
designed with different principal users in mind. 
(14)  The  requirements  for  passenger  services  may  often  conflict  with  the 
requirements for freight; the requirements for passenger services may result in 
a network which is more costly to build and maintain than one designed solely 
for freight. 
(15)  The needs of  different services need tobe properly balanced. 
( 16)  The increasing speed differential between freight and passenger rolling stock 
can lead to an exacerbation of the conflict between these two. types of traffic. 
7 (17)  Services operated under  contract to  a  public  authority  may  require  special 
rules to safeguard their attractiveness to users. 
(18)  Different users and types of users will frequently have  a different impact on 
capacity. 
( 19)  The charging and capacity-allocation schemes must take account of the effects 
of increasing saturation of capacity and ultimately the scarcity of capacity. 
(20)  The different time-frames for planning traffic types mean that it is desirable to 
ensure that requests for capacity which are made  after the completion of the 
timetabling process can be satisfied. 
(21)  The use of information technology can enhance the speed and responsiveness 
of the timetabling  process  and  improve  the  ability  of applicants  to  bid  for 
capacity, as well as improving the ability to establish train paths which cross 
more than one infrastructure manager's network. 
(22)  To ensure the optimum outcome for operators and traffic. types, it is desirable 
to  require  an  examination of the  use  of capacity when  the  coordination  of 
infrastructure capacity is required to meet the needs of users. 
(23)  In  view  of the ·monopolistic  position  of the  infrastructure  manager,  It  IS 
desirable to require an examination of the available capacity and methods of 
enhancing it  when the infrastructure capacity allocation process  is  unable to 
meet the requirement of users. 
(24)  A  lack of informf}tion  about other railway undertaking's requests  as  well  as 
about  the  constraints  within  the  system  may  make  it  difficult  for  railway 
undertakings to seek to optimise their capacity requests. 
(25)  It is important to ensure. the better coordination of allocation schemes so as to 
ensure the improved attractiveness of rail for traffic which uses the network of 
more than one infrastructure manager, in particular for international traffic. 
(26)  It is  important to  minimise the  distortions  of competition  which  may  arise, 
either  between  railway  infrastructures  or  between  transport  modes,  from 
significant differences in charging principles. 
(27)  It is  desirable to define those components of the infrastructure service which 
are essential to enable an  operator to  provide a service and which shou.ld  be 
provided in return for minimum access charges. 
(28)  Investment  in  railway  infrastructure  is  desirable  and  infrastructure charging 
schemes  should  provide  incentives  for  infrastructure  managers  to  make 
appropriate investments where they are economically attractive. 
(29)  Any charging scheme will send economic signals to· users; it is important that 
those signals to  railway undertakings should be  consistent and lead them to 
make rational decisions.  · 
8 (30) 
(31) 
(32) 
(33) 
(34) 
(35) 
(36) 
(37) 
(38) 
(39) 
(40) 
(41) 
(42) 
8 
Appropriate charging schemes for rail infrastructure coupled with appropriate 
charging schemes for other transport infrastructures and competitive operators 
will result in an optimal balance of different transport modes. 
It is desirable to allow some degree of flexibility to infrastructure managers to 
vary  charges  so  as  to  encourage  more  efficient  use  of the  infrastructure 
network for example the ability to vary train paths or a long-term commitment 
by operators.  · 
To  enable  the  establishment  of appropriate  and  fair  levels  of infrastructure 
charges, infrastructure managers should record and establish the  valuation of 
their assets and develop a clear understanding of cost factors in the operation 
of the infrastructure. 
It is  desirable to ensure .  that  account  is  taken of external costs when making 
transport decisions as outlined in the Commission's Green Paper on Fair and 
Efficient Pricing8•  ·· 
It is  desirable for any infrastructure charging scheme  to enable traffic to  use 
the rail network which can at least pay for the additional cost which it imposes 
on society. 
While negotiations for individual train paths could reflect the market value of 
the  access,  disparity  of information  may  result  in  poor  outcomes  and  the 
burden of the negotiations may be excessive. 
A railway  infrastructure  is  a natural  monopoly;  it  is  therefore  necessary  to 
provide infrastructure managers with  incentives to  reduce costs and  manage 
their infrastructure efficiently. 
It is important to ensure that charges for international traffic are not such as to 
prevent rail from meeting the needs of the market. 
The overall level of cost recovery through infrastructure charges will affect the 
necessary level of  government contribution. 
Discounts which are allowed to railway undertakings must relate to actual cost 
savings experienced. 
It is  desirable for railway undertakings and the  infrastructure manager to  be 
provided with incentives to minimise disruption of  the network. 
The  allocation  of capacity  is  associated  with  a  cost  to  the  infrastructure 
manager, payment for which should be required. 
In accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality as set out 
in  Article  5  of the  Treaty,  the  objectiyes  of this  Directive,  namely  to 
coordinate  arrangements  in  the  Member  States  governing  the  allocation  of 
railway  infrastructure  capacity  and  the  charges  made  for  the  use  thereof, 
COM(95) 691 final. 
9 cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States in  view  of the need to 
ensure  fair  and  non-discriminatory  terms  for  access  to  the  infrastructure  as 
well as to take account of the manifestly international dimensions involved in 
the  operation  of  significant  elements  of  the  railway  networks,  and  can 
therefore, by  reason of the need for coordinated trans-national action, be better 
achieved  by  the  Community;  this Directive confines  itself to  the  minimum 
required in order to achieve those objectives and does not go  beyond what it 
necessary for that purpose. 
(43)  Council Regulation (EEC) No 2830177 of 12 December 1977 on the measures 
necessary  to  achieve  comparability  between  the  accounting  systems  and 
annual  accounts  of railway  undertakings
9
,  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No 
2183178  of 19 September 1978  laying  down  uniform  costing  principles  for 
railway undertakings
10
,  Council Decision 82/529/EEC of 19 July 1982 on the 
fixing  of rates for the international carriage of goods by  rai1
11
,  and Council 
Decision 83/418/EEC of 25 July 1983 on the commercial independence of the 
railways  in  the  management  of their  international  passenger  and  luggage 
traffic12. all of which were last amended by the  Act of Accession of Austria, 
Finland and Sweden, are now superseded and should therefore be repealed. 
(44)  The requirements of Directive 95/19/EC relating to safety certification should 
be replicated in this Directive, Directive 95/19/EC should be repealed, 
HAVE ADOPTED TillS DIRECTIVE: 
1. 
2. 
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CHAPTER I 
Introductory provisions 
Article 1 
Scope 
This  Directive  concerns  the  principles  and  procedures  to  be  applied  with 
regard to  the  setting  and  charging of railway  infrastructure charges  and  the 
allocation of railway infrastructure capacity. Member States shall ensure that 
charging  and capacity-allocation  schemes for  relevant  railway  infrastructure 
follow  the  principles set down  in  this  Directive and allow  the  infrastructure 
manager  to  market  and  make  optimum  effective  use  of  the  available 
infrastructure capacity. 
This Directive applies to main-line railway infrastructure used for domestic or 
international rail services. 
OJL334, 24.12.1977,p. 13. 
OJ L 258, 21.9.1978, p.  1. 
OJ L 234, 9.8.1982, p. 5. 
OJ L 237, 26.8.1983, p. 32 
10 3.  Stand-alone local passenger networks, and networks such as tram or light rail 
which can solely be  used  for the  provision of urban  and suburban passenger 
services, are excluded from the scope of this Directive. 
Privately owned networks that exist solely for the use by the owner for its own 
freight operations are also excluded from the scope of  ~his Directive. 
4.  Railway  undertakings  and  international  groupings  the  business  of which  is 
limited to  providing  shuttle  services  for  road  vehicles  through  the  Channel 
Tunnel are excluded from the scope of this Directive. 
Article 2 
Definitions 
For the purpose of this Directive: 
(a)  'ad-hoc request' means a request for capacity which, because the requirement 
is  not  known  sufficiently  far  in  advance,  cannot  be  requested  through  the 
normal scheduling process. 
(b)  'Allocation'  means  the  allocation  of railway  infrastructure  capacity  by  an 
infrastructure manager or allocation body 
c)  'applicant' means a licensed railway undertaking or an international grouping 
of railway  undertakings.  Member  States  may  consider  also  other  persons 
and/or legal entities with a public service or commercial interest in  procuring 
infrastructure capacity for  the  operation of railway services,  such  as  public 
authorities  under  Regulation  (EEC)  1191169  (as  amended)  and  shippers, 
freight forwarders and combined transport operators, as "applicants"; 
(d)  'Capacity-constrained infrastructure'  means  a section of infrastructure for 
which demand for capacity cannot be fully satisfied even after coordination of 
the different request for capacity. 
(e)  'Capacity enhancement plan' means a measure or series of measures with a 
timetable for their implementation which are proposed to alleviate the capacity 
constraints leading to the declaration of a section of infrastructure as "capacity 
constrained infrastructure". 
(f)  'Coordination'  means  the  process  through  which  the  allocation  body  and 
applicants  will  attempt  to  resolve  situations  in  which  there  are  conflicting 
applications for infrastructure capacity. 
(g)  'Framework agreement'  means  a general agreement setting out the  railway 
infrastructure capacity needs  of  an  Applicant  over a  period longer than  one 
timetable period. 
(h)  'Infrastructure capacity'  means  the  potential to  schedule  train  paths on  an 
element of infrastructure. 
11 (i)  'Infrastructure manager' means any body or undertaking that is  responsible 
for  establishing  and  maintaining  railway  infrastructure.  This  may  include 
operating the control and safety systems. 
U)  'Network'  means the entire railway infrastructure owned and/or managed by 
an infrastructure manager. 
(k)  'Network statement' means the statement which sets out in detail the general 
rules, deadlines, procedures and criteria concerning the charging and capacity-
allocation schemes. It shall also contain such other information as  is  required 
to enable application for capacity. 
(1)  'Railway undertaking' means any public or private undertaking the business 
of which is to provide rail services for the transport of goods and/or passengers 
with a requirement that the undertaking must ensure traction. 
(m)  'Regulatory body' means the organisation which is  charged with overseeing 
the  processes  of  railway  infrastructure  capacity  allocation  and  charging 
schemes. 
(n)  'Scheduling process'  means  the  process  which begins  with applications  for 
infrastructure capacity and  is  completed with the production of the  working 
timetable. 
(  o)  'Train path' means the infrastructure capacity needed to run a train between 
two places over a given time-period. 
(p)  'Working timetable'  means  the  data defining  all  planned train  and rolling-
stock movements which will  take place  on the relevant infrastructure during 
the period for which it is in force. 
Article 3 
Network stateinent 
1.  The  infrastructure manager shall,  in  consultation  with  Applicants  and  other 
interested parties, develop and publish a network statement. 
2.  The network statement shall set out the nature of the  infrastructure which is 
available to railway undertakings. It shall contain information setting out the 
conditions for access to the relevant railway infrastructure. It shall contain a 
separate section setting oui charging principles, and tariffs where appropriate, 
as  specified in Article 7  and a section setting out capacity allocation criteria 
and rules as  specified in  Article  17.  It shall also contain detailed information 
on procedures and deadlines to be followed. 
3.  The network statement shall be made available to all  parties that are or may 
wish to be Applicants, at a charge not exceeding its cost of publication. 
4.  The network statement shall be kept up to date, and modified as necessary. 
12 CHAPTER II 
Infrastructure charges 
Article 4 
Establishing, detennining and collecting charges 
1.  Member  States  shall  establish  a  charging  framework  while  respecting  the 
managerial independence laid down in Article 7 of  Directive 911440/EEC. The 
establishing of specific charging rules, the determination of charges for the use 
of infrastructure and the collection of those charges shall be  performed by the 
infrastructure manager or by a charging body that is  independent in  its  legal 
form  and  organisation  and  decision-making  from  any  railway  undertaking. 
References in this chapter to the infrastructure manager shall be understood as 
referring to either of  these organisations. 
2.  Infrastructure managers shall collaborate to achieve the efficient operation of 
train services  which  cross  more than  one  infrastructure network.  They may 
establish such joint organisations as are appropriate to enable this to take place. 
Any collaboration or joint organisation shall be bound by the rules set out in 
this Directive. 
3.  Except  where  specific  arrangements  are  made  under  Article  9  (2), 
infrastructure managers shall ensure that the charging system in use is based on 
the same principles over the whole of  their network. 
4.  Infrastructure managers shall ensure that the application of  the charging system 
results  in  objective,  equivalent  and  non-discriminatory charges  for  different 
railway undertakings that perform services of equivalent nature  in  a  similar 
part of the market. 
5.  An  infrastructure  manager  or charging  body  shall  respect  the  commercial 
confidentiality of information provided to it by Applicants. 
Article 5 
Services 
1.  Railway  undertakings  shall be  entitled  to  the  package  of services  that  are 
described in the Annex as the minimum access package as well as those of the 
services described in the Annex as access services which are required. If  the 
services  are  not  offered  by  the  same  infnistructure  manager,  the  railway 
undertakings must conclude contracts with all  the infrastructure managers or 
service  providers.  The  provider  of the  'main  infrastructure'  shall  help  to 
provide these services. 
13 2.  To ensure  the  safe  operation  of the  network,  railway  undertakings  may  be 
required by the infrastructure manager to procure a number of services. These 
services are described in the Annex as mandatory services and may be supplied 
by  the  infrastructure  manager  or  by  some  other  body  approved  by  an 
independent regulatory body. 
3.  Where the infrastructure manager offers any of the range of services described 
in the  Annex as  additional services he  shall supply them upon  request  to  an 
applicant. 
4.  Railway undertakings may request a further range of ancillary services,  listed 
in  the  Annex,  from  the  infrastructure manager or from  other suppliers.  The 
infrastructure manager is not obliged to supply these services. 
Article 6 
Infrastructure cost and accounts 
1.  Member  States  shall  lay  down  conditions,  including  where  appropriate 
advance payments,  to  ensure that the  accounts of an  infrastructure manager 
shall, under normal business conditions over a reasonable time period, at least 
balance  inco~e from  infrastructure charges,  surplus  from  other  commercial 
activities and State aid,  on the one hand, and infrastructure expenditure on the· 
other. Such aid shall be made in accordance with Articles 73, 87  and 88 of the 
Treaty. 
2.  Infrastructure  managers  shall,  due  regard  being  had  to  safety  and  to 
maintaining and  improving  the  quality  of  the  infrastructure  service,  be 
provided with incentives to reduce the costs of provision of infrastructure and 
the level of access charges. 
3.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  the  pr~vtston set  out  in  paragraph  2  is 
implemented,  either through a contractual agreement between the  competent 
authority and  infrastructure manager covering a period of not  less than  three 
years which provides for State aid as referred to in paragraph 1, or through the 
establishment of an appropriate regulatory scheme with adequate powers. 
4.  Where a contractual agreement as described in paragraph 3 exists, the terms of 
the  contract  and  the  structure  of the  payments  agreed  to  provide  financial 
support to the infrastructure manager shall be agreed in  advance to  cov~r the 
whole of the period of the contract. 
5.  Infrastructure managers shall develop and maintain an inventory of assets that 
they manage, which shall contain their current valuation as well  as  details of 
expenditure on enhancement and renewal of the infrastructure. 
6.  The  infrastructure  manager  shall  establish  a  methodology  for  apportioning 
costs between different types of rolling stock and operations, based upon  the 
best available understanding of  cost causation. 
14 Article 7 
Statement of  charges and charging schemes 
1.  The infrastructure manager shall, in  consultation with the applicants and other 
interested parties,  prepare  a  statement  of charges  and  charging  schemes  for 
inclusion in the network statement.  · 
2.  The statement shall  contain  appropriate  details  of the  charging  scheme  and 
sufficient information on charges that apply to the  servi~es .listed in the Annex 
which  are  provided  by  only  one  supplier.  The  statement  shall  contain 
information on the  charging scheme in  force  as  well as  indications of likely 
changes  in  charges  for  the  following  five  years. It shall  contain  a  general 
analysis  of sales  and  i:lcome  which  does  not  permit  identification  of the 
charges payable by an undertaking for a specific service. 
3.  Where an infrastructure manager implements a discount scheme as defined in 
Article  10,  a  performance  scheme  as  defined  in  Article  12,  or reservation 
charges  as  defined  in  Article  13,  then  details  of these  schemes  shall  be 
included in the statement of charges. 
4.  Upon receiving a reasonable  request  from an  applicant,  the regulatory body 
shall require infrastructure managers to make available to the regulatory body, 
within one month and free of charge, sufficiently detailed costing information 
used for infrastructure charge calculatiOns as well as data illustrating the basis 
on which they establish and apportion costs between different types of rolling· 
stock and services to enable that applicant to satisfy himself that the charges 
comply with the requirements of this Directive. 
5.  To  permit  the  assessment  of the  feasibility  of operation  of a  service  an 
infrastructure manager shall  provide  free  of charge,  within  one  month  of a 
request  from  an  applicant,  information  on  charges  which  would  apply  for 
rolling  stock  types  or  services  which  are  not  covered  in  the  published 
information. 
Article 8 
Principles of  charging 
1.  Charges for the use of railway infrastructure shall be paid to the infrastructure 
manager and used to fund his business. 
2.  Membe.r States may require the infrastructure !Jlanager to provide all necessary 
information on the charges. 
3.  Without  prejudice  to  paragraph  4  or 5  or to Article  9,  the  charges  for  the 
minimum access package and access to services, shall be set at the cost that is 
directly incurred as a result of operating the train. 
15 4.  The  infrastructure  charge  may  be  modified  by  a  charge  which· reflects  the 
scarcity of capacity of the  identifiable  segment  of the  infrastructure  during 
peiiods of congestion. 
5.  The infrastructure charge may be modified by a charge to take account of the 
cost of the environmental effects caused by the operation of the train.  Such a 
charge  shall  be  differentiated  as  a  function  of the  magnitude  of the  effect 
caused. In the absence of any comparable level of charging of environmental 
costs in other, competing modes of transport, ary such charges shall result in 
no overall change in revenue to the infrastructure  manager. If a comparable 
level  of charging of environmental  costs  has  been  introduced  for  rail  and 
competing modes of transport and that generates additional revenue,  it  is  for 
Member States to decide how the revenue shall be used. 
6.  To avoid undesirable disproportionate fluctuations,  the charges referred to in 
paragraphs 3,  4  and  5  may  be  averaged  over  a  reasonable  spread  of trains 
services and times. Nevertheless, the relative magnitudes of the  infrastructure 
charges shall be. related to the costs attributable to the services. 
7.  Where  services  listed  in  Annex  1  as  additional,  mandatory  and  ancillary 
services are offered only by one supplier the charge imposed for such a service 
shall  relate to the cost of providing it,  calculated on the basis of  the  actual 
level of use. 
8.  Charges  may  be  levied  for  capacity used  for  the  purpose  of infrastructure 
maintenance.  Such  charges  shall  not  exceed  the  net  revenue  loss  to  the 
infrastructure manager caused by the maintenance. 
9.  The level of  the charges referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 and Article 9 shall be 
determined on the basis of a methodology on which interested parties shall be 
consulted in advance.  The methodology employed shall  be  described  in  the 
network statement.  · 
Article 9 
Exceptions to charging principles 
1.  Where a Member State wishes  to  allow  higher revenue than that  produced by 
the  charges  permitted  by  Article  8,  the  infrastructure  manager  may,  if the 
market can bear this,  levy mark-ups on the basis of efficient, transparent and 
non-discriminatory  options,  while  guaranteeing  optimum  competitiveness  in 
particular of international rail freight. The charging system shall not fully offset 
productivity increases achieved by railway undertakings. 
A  higher  charge  may  be  set  either  through  mark-ups  for  individual  market 
segments, or through individually negotiated contracts, or through a system of 
fixed and variable charges. However, in market segments which can pay overall 
at  least  the  costs that are  incurred as  a result of operating the  train  services, 
those services shall not be prevented from utilising infrastructure capacity. 
16 2.  For specific investment projects, the infrastructure manager may set or continue 
to  set higher charges on the basis of the long-term costs of such projects if they 
increase efficiency and/or cost effectiveness and could not otherwise be or have 
been undertaken. Such a charging arrangement may also incorporate agreements 
on the sharing of the risk associated with new investments, in particular between 
infrastructure managers and applicants. 
3.  To  prevent  discrimination,  it  shall  be  ensur~d that  any  given  infrastructure 
manager's  average  and  marginal  charges  for  equivalent  uses  of  his 
infrastructure are comparable and that comparable services in  the same market 
segment are subject to the same charges. The infrastructure manager shall show 
in  the  network statement without disclosing confidential  business  information 
that the charging system meets these requirements. 
4.  For the  purpose of establishing charges for the  use  of infrastructure for freight 
services  which  cross  more  than  one  network,  infrastructure  managers  shall 
collaborate to guarantee the optimum competitiveness of these  services. They 
may establish such joint organisations as  are appropriate to  enable this to take 
place. Any collaboration or  joint organisation shall be bound by the rules set out 
in this directive. 
Article 10 
Discounts 
1.  Without prejudice to Articles 81, 82 and 86 of the Treaty, any discount on the 
charges levied on a railway undertaking by the infrastructure manager, for any 
service, shall comply with the criteria set out in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4. 
2.  Discounts shall not exceed the actual cost saving to the infrastructure manager 
from the operation in comparison with a single isolated equivalent journey. In 
determining the  level of discount,  no  account may be  taken of cost savings 
already internalised in the charge levied. 
3.  Discounts  may  only  relate  to  charges  levied  for  a  specified  infrastructure 
section. 
4.  Separate discount schemes shall apply for different types of service. 
Article 11 
Compensation schemes for unpaid marginal external and infrastructure costs 
1.  Member States may put in place a time-limited scheme to compensate for the 
use  of railway  infrastructure for the  demonstrably unpaid  marginal  external 
and infrastructure costs of other transport modes in  so far as  these exceed the 
marginal external and infrastructure costs of rail. 
17 2.  The methodology used and calculations performed must be publicly available. 
It shall in particular be possible to demonstrate the specific uncharged costs of 
the competing transport infrastructure that are  avoided and to  ensure that  the 
scheme is granted on non-discriminatory terms to undertakings. 
3.  · Member States shall ensure that such a scheme is compatible with Articles 73, 
87 and 88 of the Treaty. 
Article 12 
Perfomzance scheme 
1.  Infrastructure charging schemes shall encourage railway undertakings and the 
infrastructure manager to minimise disruption and improve the performance of 
the railway  network.  This  shall  be  achieved through a  perf<?rmance  scheme 
which  provides  for  penalties  for  actions  which  disrupt  the  operation of the 
network,  compensation  for  undertakings  which  suffer  from  disruption  and 
·bonuses that reward better than planned performance. 
2.  The  basic  principles  of the  performance  scheme  shall  apply  throughout 
the network. 
·  Article 13 
Reservation charges 
Infrastructure managers may levy an appropriate charge for capacity that is requested 
but not used. This charge shall provide incentives for efficient use of capacity. 
CHAPTER III 
Allocation of  capacity 
Article 14 
Capacity rights 
1.  The right to  permit train operations on railway infrastructure shall  belong  to 
the infrastructure manager of that network. 
2.  Capacity shall be allocated by an infrastructure manager and, once allocated to 
an applicant, may not be transferred by the recipient to another undertaking or 
service. The  use  of capacity by a railway undertaking when carrying out the 
business  of an  applicant  who  is  not  a  railway  undertaking  shall  not  be 
considered a transfer. 
18 3.  The right to use specific railway infrastructure capacity in the form of a train 
path may be granted to  applicants for a maximum duration of one timetable 
period. 
An  infrastructure  manager  and  an  applicant  may  enter  into  a  framework 
agreement for the use of capacity on the relevant railway infrastructure for a 
longer term than one t.imetable period, in the manner laid down in Articl~ 20. 
4.  Infrastructure managers  and  applicants  shall  enter into  contracts that define 
their respective rights and obligations in respect of any allocation of  capacity. 
Article 15 
Capacity allocation 
1.  Member  States  may  establish  a  framework  for  the  allocation  of railway 
infrastructure  capacity  while  respecting  the  managerial  independence  laid 
down in Article 7 of Directive 91/440/EEC. The infrastructure manager or an 
allocation body that is  independent from any railway undertaking in  its  legal 
form and organisation and decision making shall establish the specific capacity 
allocation  rules  and  shall  perform  the  capacity  allocation  processes.  All 
references in this chapter to the infrastructure manager shall be understood to 
refer to  whichever of these  is  appropriate.  In  particular,  the  infrastructure 
manager shall ensure that railway infrastructure capacity is allocated on a fair 
and non-discriminatory basis and in accordance with Community law. 
2.  Infrastructure managers  and  allocation  bodies  shall  respect  the  commercial 
confidentiality of information provided to them. 
Article 16 
Collaboration to allocate capacity on more than one network 
1.  Infrastructure managers shall collaborate to enable the  efficient creation and 
allocation  of capacity  which  crosses  more  than  one  network.  They  may 
establish suchjoint organisations as are appropriate to enable this to take place. 
Any collaboration or joint organisation shall be bound by the rules set out in 
this Directive. 
In particular, they shall establish an organisation to coordinate the allocation of 
capacity at an international level that includes representatives of infrastructure 
managers for  all  railway  infrastructures whose  allocation decisions  have  an 
impact ·on more than one other infrastructure manager. This organisation may 
include appropriate representatives of infrastructure managers from outside the 
Community. The Commission shall be informed and shall be invited to attend 
meetings of the organisation as an observer. 
19 2.  At  any  meeting  or  other  actlvtty  undertaken  to  permit  the  allocation  of 
infrastructure capacity for trans-network train services, decisions shall only be 
taken by representatives of infrastructure managers. 
3.  The participants in the collaboration referred to paragraph 1 shall ensure that 
its membership, methods of operation and all relevant criteria which are used 
for assessing and allocating capacity be made publicly available. 
4.  Working in collaboration as referred to in  the first subparagraph of paragraph 
1,  infrastructure managers may assess the need for,  and may where necessary 
organise and request the creation of international  train paths to facilitate  the 
operation at short notice of freight trains. 
Such  pre-arranged  international  train  paths  shall  be  made  available  to 
applicants via any of the participating infrastructure managers. 
Article 17 
Network statement - capacity allocation 
1.  The infrastructure managers  in  consultation with  applicants,  other interested 
parties and,  where appropriate, other infrastructure managers, shall prepare a 
statement of capacity allocation principles and criteria which shall form part of 
the network statement. 
2.  This  statement  shall  set  out  the  general  capacity  characteristics  of  the 
infrastructure which is  available to railway undertakings and any restrictions 
relating to its use, including likely capacity requirements for maintenance. 
3.  The statement shall specify the procedures and deadlines which relate to  the 
capacity  allocation  process.  It  shall  contain  specific  criteria  which  are 
employed during that process, in particular: 
(a)  the modalities according to which applicants may request capacity from 
the infrastructure manager; 
(b)  the requirements governing applicants; 
(c)  the schedule for the application and allocation processes; 
(d)  the principles governing the coordination process; 
· (e)  the  procedures  which  shall  be  followed  and  criteria  used  where 
infrastructure is capacity constrained; and 
(f)  details of specialised infrastructure designations; 
(g)  any  conditions  by  which  account  is  taken  of  previous  levels  of 
utilisation  of  capacity  in  determining  priorities  for  the  allocation 
process. 
20 4.  The statement shall detail the measures taken to ensure the adequate treatment 
of freight services, international services and short-notice requests. 
5.  The statement shall be published no  less than four months  in  advance of the 
deadline for requests for infrastructure capacity. 
Article 18 
Principles of  allocation 
In determining its statement on capacity allocation, the infrastructure manager shall 
have regard to the necessity or desirability of factors such as: 
(a)  sharing the capacity and securing the development of the infrastructure for the 
carriage of passengers and goods for domestic and international traffic in the 
most efficient and economical manner in the  interests of all  users of railway 
services; 
(b)  prevention of discrimination between undertakings or classes of undertakings; 
(c)  promotion of  competition in the provision of railway services; 
(d)  maintaining and improving service reliability levels; 
(e)  satisfaction  of reasonable  requirements  of applicants  and  the  infrastructure 
manager with regard to the future development of their businesses; 
(f)  maximisation of the  flexibility  available to the  infrastructure  managers  with 
regard  to  the  allocation  of capacity,  but  consistent  with  satisfaction  of the 
applicant's reasonable requirements; 
(g)  prevention  of any  imposition  of undue  constraints  on  the  wishes  of other 
undertakings holding, or intending to hold,  rights to use  the  infrastructure to 
develop their business; 
(h)  appropriate regard to the financial interests of providers of public funds for the 
purchase of passenger services; 
(i)  providing incentives for good performance. 
Article 19 
Applicants 
1.  Applications for railway infrastructure capacity may in  principle be made by 
railway undertakings  and their  international groupings.  Member States may 
also allow other applicants to apply for railway infrastructure capacity. 
21 2.  The infrastructure manager may set requirements with regard to  applicants to 
ensure that its legitimate expectations about future revenues and utilisation of 
the  infrastructure  are  safeguarded.  Such  requirements  shall  be  appropriate, 
transparent  and  non-discriminatory.  The requirements  shall  be  published  as 
part of the allocation principles in the network statement, and the Commission 
shall be informed. 
3.  The requirements in paragraph 2 may only include the provision of a financial 
guarantee  that  must  not  exceed  an  appropriate  level  which  shall  be 
proportional  to  the  contemplated  level  of  activity  of  the  applicant,  and 
assurance of the capability to prepare compliant bids for capacity. 
Article 20 
Framework agreements 
1.  Without prejudice to Articles 81, 82 and 86 of the Treaty, an applicant and an 
infrastructure manager  may  enter into  a  framework agreement that specifies 
the  characteristics  of the  railway  infrastructure  capacity  required  by  the 
applicant over a period of time exceeding one timetable period. The framework 
agreement shall not specify a train path in detail, l;>ut  should be such as to seek 
to meet the legitimate commercial needs of the applicant.  · 
2.  Framework agreements shall not be such as to preclude the use of the relevant 
infrastructure by other applicants or services. 
3.  A  framework  agreement  shall  allow  for the  amendment  or limitation of its 
terms to enable better use to be made of the railway infrastructu~e. 
4.  The parties to a framework agreement may agree penalties in the event of its 
being necessary to modify or terminate the agreement. 
5.  Framework agreements  shall  in  principle be  no  longer than  five  years.  The 
infrastructure manager  may  agree  to a  longer period in  specific  cases.  Any 
such exemption shall  be  justified by the existence of commercial  contracts, 
specialised investments or risks. 
6.  While  respecting  commercial  confidentiality,  the  general  nature  of each 
framework agreement shall be made available to any interested party. 
7.  Users  with  specific  needs  may  wish  to  define  aspects  of capacity  in  the 
framework agreement more closely than is normally permitted, in recognition 
of  its  economic  or  social  importance.  Infrastructure  managers  may  take 
account of such requirements for more specifically defined capacity, provided 
that it  is  purchased through  a contract that recognises the  cost of this  to the 
infrastructure manager and that it  is compatible with the principles set out in 
the network statement. 
22 Article 21 
Schedule for the allocation process 
1.  The infrastructure manager shall adhere to the schedule for capacity allocation 
set out in Annex 2. 
2.  The working timetable shall be established once per calendar year. 
3.  Infrastructure managers shall agree international train paths to be included in 
the  working  timetable,  with  the  other  relevant  infrastructure  managers 
concerned  before  commencing  consultation  on  the  draft  timetable. 
Adjustments shall only be made if absolutely necessary. 
Article 22 
Application 
1.  Applicants may apply to  the  infrastructure manager to :request  an  agreement 
granting rights to  use railway infrastructure against a charge as  laid down in 
Chapter II. 
2.  Requests relating to the regular timetable must adhere to fhe deadlines set out 
in Article 21. 
3.  An  applicant  who  is  a  party  to  a  framework  agreement  shall  apply  in 
accordance with that agreement. 
4.  Applicants may request capacity crossing more than one network by applying 
to  one  infrastructure  manager.  That  infrastructure  manager  shall  then  be 
permitted to  act  on  behalf of the  applicant  to  seek  capacity with  the  other 
relevant infrastructure manager. 
5.  Infrastructure managers shall ensure that, for capacity crossing more than one 
network, applicants may apply direct to any joint body which the infrastructure 
managers establish. 
Article 23 
Scheduling 
1.  The  infrastructure  manager  shall  as  far  as  is  possible  meet  all  requests  for 
capacity including requests for train paths crossing more than one network, and 
shall as far as possible take account of all  constraints on applicants, including 
the economic effect on their business. 
23 2.  The  infrastructure  manager  shall  ensure  that,  except  as  set  out  in  Articles 
20 (7), 25  (3) and 27, no priority is  given to  any type of service or applicant 
within the scheduling and coordination process. 
3.  The  infrastructure  manager  shall  consult  interested  parties  about  the  draft 
timetable and allow them at least one month to present their views. Interested 
parties  shall include all  those who  have requested capacity as  well as  other 
parties who wish to have the opportunity to comment on how  the timetable 
may  affect  their  ability  to  procure  rail  services  during  the  currency  of the 
timetable.  · 
4.  The infrastructure manager shall take appropriate measures .to  deal with any 
concerns that are expressed. 
Article 24 
Coordination process 
1.  During the  scheduling  process,  when  the  infrastructure  manager  encounters 
conflicts between different requests then he shall attempt, through coordination 
of the requests, to ensure the best possible matching of all requirements. 
2.  When a situation requiring coordination arises, the infrastructure manager shall 
have the right, within reasonable limits, to propose capacity that differs from 
that which was requested. 
3.  The  infrastructure  manager  shall  attempt,  through  consultation  with  the 
appropriate applicants, to achieve a resolution of any conflicts in the light of 
the principles set out in Article 18. 
4.  The  principles  governing  the  coordination  process  shall  be  defined  in  the 
network statement. These shall in particular reflect the difficulty of arranging 
international train paths and the effect that  modification may have on other 
infrastructure managers. 
5.  When  requests  for  capacity  cannot  be  satisfied  without  coordination, 
the infrastructure  manager  shall  attempt  to  accommodate  all  requests 
through coordination. 
Article 25 
Scarcity of  capacity 
1.  Where  aft~r  coordination  of  the  requested  paths  and  consultation  with 
applicants it is not possible to adequately satisfy requests for capacity then the 
infrastructure manager must immediately declare that element of infrastructure 
on which this has occurred to be capacity constrained infrastructure. This shall 
24 also  be  done  for  infrastructure  which  it  can  be  foreseen  will  suffer  from 
insufficient capacity in the near future. 
2.  When  infrastructure  capacity  has  been  declared  to  be  constrained,  the 
infrastructure  manager shall  carry  out  a  capacity  analysis  as  described  in 
Article 28,  unless  a capacity enhancement plan  as  described in  Article  29  is 
already being implemented. 
3.  When charges levied under Article 8 (4) have not achieved a satisfactory result 
and  the  infrastructure  capacity  has  been  declared  to  be  constrained,  the 
infrastructure  manager  may  in  addition  employ  priority criteria  to  allocate 
capacity. 
. 
4.  The  priority  criteria  shall  take  account  of the  importance  of a  service  to 
society,  relative  to  any other service  which  will  consequently  be  excluded. 
This shall include taking account of the effect in other Member States. 
5.  The  importance  of freight  services  and  in  particular  international  freight 
services shall be given adequate consideration in determining priority criteria. 
6.  For capacity-constrained infrastructure, the infrastructure manager shall, to an 
appropriate degree, take sufficient steps to ensure that it can accommodate ad-
hoc  requests which  are  foreseen  or foreseeable  at  the  time of the  scheduling 
process. It shall ensure that the ability to satisfy these requests is  comparable 
with that for requests.within the timetabling process. 
7.  The procedures which shall be followed and criteria used:where infrastructure 
is capacity-constrained shall be set out in the network statement. 
Article 26 
Ad-hoc requests 
1.  The infrastructure manager shall respond to ad-hoc requests for individual train 
paths  as  quickly  as  possible  but  in  no  more  than  five  working  day~. 
Information supplied on available spare capacity shall be made available to all 
applicants who may wish to use this capacity. 
2.  Infrastructure managers shall where necessary undertake an  evaluation of the 
need  for  reserve  capacity  to  be  kept  available  within  the  final  scheduled 
timetable to enable them to rapidly respond to foreseeable ad-hoc requests for 
capacity. 
25 Article 27 
Specialised infrastructure 
1.  Unless suitable alternative routes exist, railway infrastructure capacity shall be 
considered to be available for the use of all types of service which conform to 
the characteristics necessary for operation on the line. 
2.  Where there  are  suitable  alternative  routes the  infrastructure  manager  may, 
after consultation with interested parties, designate particular infrastructure for 
use by specified types of traffic. Without prejudice to Articles 81, 82 and 86 of 
the Treaty,  when  such  designation  has  occurred,  the  infrast'ructure  manager 
may give priority to this type of traffic when allocating capacity. 
Such designation shall not prevent the use of such infrastructure by other types 
of traffic  when  capacity  is  available  and  when  the  train  conforms  to  the 
characteristics necessary for operation on the l,ine.  · 
3.  When infrastructure has been designated pursuant to paragraph 2, this shall be 
described in the network statement. 
Article 28. · · 
Capacity analysis 
1.  The objective of a capacity analysis referred to in Article 25 (2) is to determine 
the restrictions on  capacity which  prevent requests  for  capacity  from  being 
adequately met, and to propose methods of enabling additional requests to be 
satisfied. This analysis shall identify the reasons for the constraints and what 
measures might be taken in the short and medium term to ease the constraints. 
2.  The  analysis  shall  consider the  infrastructure, the  operating  procedures,  the 
nature of the different services operating and the effect of all these factors on 
capacity.  Any measures proposed include in particular re-routing of services, 
re-timing services, speed alterations and infrastructure improvements. 
3.  A  capacity  analysis  shall  be  performed  by  the  infrastructure  manager  in 
consultation with current and prospective users of  the relevant infrastructure. 
4.  A capacity analysis shall be completed within two months of the identification 
of infrastructure as capacity constrained. 
26 Anicle 29 
Capacity enhancement plan 
1.  Within  six  months  of the  completion  of a  capacity  analysis  described  in 
Article 28,  the infrastructure manager shall  produce a capacity enhancement 
plan. 
2.  A capacity enhancement plan shall be developed after consultation with users 
of the relevant capacity constrained infrastructure. It will identify 
- the !easons for the capacity congestion, 
-the likely future development of  traffic, 
- the constraints .on infrastructure development, 
- the options and costs for  enhancement  including  likely changes to  access 
charges, 
and on the basis of a cost benefit analysis of the possible measures identified 
determine  what  action  should  be  taken  to  enhance  capacity,  including  a 
timetable  for implementation of the  measures.  The plan  may  be  subject  to 
prior approval by the Member State. 
3.  Unless  it  is  for  reasons  beyond  his  control,  or  where  the  only  option  is 
economically unviable,  where an  infrastructure manager does not  propose  a 
plan  or  make  progress  with  the  action  plan  identified  in  the  capacity 
enhancement plan, then he shall, on request of railway undertakings using the 
relevant infrastructure, cease to levy any fees which are levied in respect of the 
shortage of capacity for the relevant infrastructure. 
Anicle 30 
Use of  train paths 
1.  Infrastructure managers shall impose conditions concerning the  utilisation of. 
train paths which they grant to applicants as set out in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4. 
2.  For capacity constrained infrastructure, the infrastructure manager shall require 
the surrender of a train path which, over a period of at least one month, has 
been used on less than 75% of  the occasions for which it has been booked. 
3.  For infrastructure sections where coordination was required, but which are not 
capacity constrained, the infrastructure manager may require the surrender of a 
train path which, over a period of at least one month, has. been used on. less 
than 75% of the occasions for which it has been booked. 
27 4.  In the network statement, an infrastructure manager may specify conditions by 
which  it  will take account of previous  levels of utilisation of train paths  in 
determining priorities for the allocation process. 
Article 31 
Infrastructure capacity for maintenance 
1.  Requests for  infrastructure capacity to  enable  maintenance to  be  performed, 
shall be submitted during the scheduling process. 
2.  Adequate account shall be taken by the infrastructure manager of the effect of 
capacity reserved for track maintenance on other applicants. 
Article 32 
Arbitration 
1.  The infrastructure manager shall ensure that an arbitration procedure capability 
which can reach a decision on a dispute within ten working days is available 
when it  allocates  railway capacity or p'articipates  in  a joint organisation  to 
allocate  international  railway  capacity.  The  arbitration  shall  assist  in  the 
resolution of disputes relating to the allocation of infrastructure capacity. The 
procedures  and  method  of operation  shall  be  agreed  in  consultation  with 
applicants and shall be published  as part of  the network statement. 
2.  Where  arbitration  is  required,  each  participant  shall  pay  its  own  costs. 
Additional costs of  the arbitration shall be shared equally between the parties. 
3.  When  applicants  and  an  infrastructure  manager  or  joint  organisation  of 
infrastructure managers request  arbitration,  they shall  commit themselves to 
provide  all  information  required  to  reach  a  decision  and  shall  agree  to  be 
bound by the decision of the arbitration body. 
CHAPTER IV 
General measures 
Article 33 
Regulatory body 
1.  Without prejudice  to  Article  32,  Member States shall  establish  a. regulatory 
body.  This  body  shall  be  independent  in  its  organisation,  funding,  legal 
structure  and  decision-making  from  any  infrastructure  manager,  charging 
28 body, allocation body or applicant. The body shall function according to the 
principles outlined in paragraphs 2 to 8 below. 
2.  An undertaking shall have a right to appeal to the regulatory body if it believes 
that it has  been unfairly treated, discriminated against or is  in  any other way 
aggrieved,  and  in  particular against  decisions  adopted  by  the  infrastructure 
manager concerning: 
(a)  the network statement; 
(b)  criteria contained within it; 
(c)  the allocation process and its result; 
(d)  the charging scheme; 
(e)  level  or structure of infrastructure  fees  which  they  are,  or may  be, 
required to pay. 
3.  The regulatory body shall ensure that charges set by the infrastructure manager 
comply  with  Chapter  II  and  are  non-discriminatory.  Negotiation  between 
undertakings  and  an  infrastructure  manager  concerning  the  level  of 
infrastructure charges in as provided for in Article 9 (1) shall only be permitted 
if these  are  carried out  under  the  supervision  of the  regulatory  body.  The 
regulatory  body  shall intervene  if negotiations  are  likely  to  contravene  the 
requirements of  this Directive. 
4.  The regulatory body shall have the power to request relevant information from 
the infrastructure manager, applicants and any third party involved within the 
Member State concerned, which must be supplied without undue delay. 
5.  The regulatory body shall be required to determine any complaints and take 
action to remedy the situation within a maximum period of two months from 
receipt of all information. 
6.  A decision of the regulatory body shall be binding on all  parties covered by 
that decision. 
7.  In the event of an appeal on a refusal to grant capacity, or on the terms of an 
offer of capacity, the regulatory body shall either confirm that no modification 
of  the,  infrastructure  manager  decision  is  required,  or  it  shall  require 
modification of that  decision. in  accordance with  directions  specified  by the 
regulatory body. 
8.  Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that decisions taken 
by the regulatory body are subject to judicial review. 
9.  The national regulatory bodies shall conduct an active exchange of views and 
experiences for the purposes of co-ordinating their decision-making principles. 
The Commission shall support them in this task. 
29 Article 34 
Safety certification 
1.  The arrangem~nts for safety certification for railway undertakings which are or 
will  be  established in  the  Community and the  international groupings which 
they form, where such undertakings and groupings carry out services referred 
to in Article 10 of  Directive 911440/EEC under the conditions laid down in that 
Article shall be in accordance With paragFaphs 2 and 3 of this Article. 
2.  The Member States shall provide that a safety certificate in which the railway 
undertakings' safety requirements are set out be  submitted in order to ensure 
safe service on the routes concerned. 
3.  In order to  obtain the safety certificate, the railway undertaking shall comply 
with the regulations under national law, compatible with Community law and 
applied  in  a  non-discriminatory  manner,  laying  down  the  technical  and 
operational requirements specific to rail services and the safety requirements 
applying to staff, rolling stock and the undertaking's internal organisation. 
In particular, it  shall  provide proof that the staff whom it employs to operate 
and accompany  the  trains  providing  services  referred  to  in  Article  10  of 
Directive 91/440/EEC  has  the  necessary training  to  comply  with  the  traffic 
rules applied by the infrastructure manager and to· meet the safety requirements 
imposed on it in the interests of train movement. 
The railway undertaking shall also prove that the rolling stock: making up the 
trains  has  been  approved  by  the  public  authority  or  by  the  infrastructure 
manager and checked in accordance with the operating rules applicable to the 
infrastructure  used.  The  safety  certificate  shall  be  issued  by  the  authority 
designated for  the  purpose  by the  Member State in  which the  infrastructure 
used is situated. 
Article 35 
Report and modification of  annexes 
1.  The  Commission  shall,  four  years  after  entry  into  force  of this  Directive, 
submit  to  the  Council  a report,  accompanied if necessary  by  proposals  for 
further Community action. 
2.  Where there  is  a need  to  modify  either annex  1 or 2 of this  directive,  the 
procedure  set  out  in  article  lla (3)  of Council  Directive  91/440/EEC,  as 
amended  by  European  Parliament  and  Council  Directive  2000/  .. /EC,  sha11 
apply. 
30 Article 36 
Implementation 
Member  States  shall  adopt  the  laws,  regulations  and  administrative  provisions 
necessary to comply with this Directive no later than one year following the date of its 
entry into force. They shall forthwith informthe Commission thereof. 
When Member States  adopt those provisions,  they shall contain  a reference to this 
Directive  or be  accompanied  by  such  reference  on  the  occasion  of their  official 
publication. Member States shall determine how such reference is to be made. 
Article 37 
Repeals 
Regulation (EEC) No 2830177, Regulation (EEC) No 2183178, Decision 82/529/EEC, 
and Directive 95/19/EC are  hereby repealed with effect from the  date laid down  in 
Article 36. 
Article 38 
Entry into force 
This  Directive  shall  enter  into  force  on  the  twentieth  day  following  that  of its 
publication in the Official Journal ofthe European Communities. 
31 Article 39 
Addressees 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 
Done at Brussels, 
For the Parliament 
The President 
32 
For the Council 
The President ANNEX 1 
The minimum acc,ess package shall comprise: 
(a)  .  handling of requests for capacity; 
(b)  the right to utilise track capacity which is granted; 
(c)  use of running track points and junctions; 
(d)  train  control  including  signalling,  regulation,  dispatching  and  the 
communication and provision of information on train movement; 
(e)  all other information required to  implement or operate the service  for  which 
capacity has been granted. 
Access services shall comprise: 
(a)  access to refuelling facilities; 
(b)  access to passenger stations, their buildings and other facilities; 
(c)  access to freight terminals; 
(d)  access to marshalling yards; 
(e)  access to train formation facilities; 
(f)  'access to storage sidings; 
(g)  access to maintenance and other technical facilities. 
Mandatory services shall comprise: 
(a)  assistance  in  the  case  of serious  incidents  or serious  disturbance  to  normal 
train movements; 
(b)  police intervention where necessitated; 
(c)  monitoring  the  compliance  with  safety  and  regulatory  standards  by 
undertakings. 
Additional services shall comprise: 
(a)  use of  electrical supply equipment for traction current; 
(b)  traction current; 
(c)  pre-heating of passenger trains; 
(d)  supply of fuel; 
(e)  shunting; 
(f)  tailor made contracts for: 
control of transport of dangerous goods, 
assistance in running abnormal trains. 
33 Ancillary Services shall comprise: 
(a)  access to telecommunication network; 
(b)  provision of supplementary information; 
(c)  technical inspection of rolling stock. 
34 ANNEX2 
Allocation Pro9ess 
(1) The timetable change shall take place at  midnight  on  the  last Saturday in  May. 
Where a change or adjustment is carried out after the  summer it  shall take place 
on the  last Saturday in  September each year and at  such other intervals between 
these dates as are required. 
(2) The  final  date for receipt  of requests  for  capacity  to  be  incorporated into  the 
working timetable shall be no more than  12  months  in  advance of the entry into 
force of the timetable. 
(3) No  later than  11  months  before  the  working  timetable  comes  into  force,  the 
infrastructure managers shall ensure that provisional international train paths have 
been established in collaboration with other relevant allocation bodies as set out in 
Article  16.  Infrastructure managers shall ensure that  as  far as  possible these  are 
adhered to during the subsequent processes. 
ffi No later than four months after the deadline for submission of bids by applicants, 
the infrastructure manager shall prepare a draft timetable. 
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